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Abstract
Traditional Voice-over-IP applications such as Microsoft NetMeeting
assume that the user is on a machine with a fixed IP address. If, however, the
user connects to the Internet, via a wireless network, on a handheld device, his
IP address frequently changes as he moves from one subnet to another. In such a
situation, we need a service that can be queried for the most current IP address
of a person whom we wish to contact. In this project, we design and implement
such a directory service. The service authenticates all callers and callees, is
robust against most host failure, and scales to several thousand registered users.
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Introduction
Most existing network applications assume that one is on a machine that has a fixed IP

address during the duration of the application. With the advent of mobile devices and wireless
networking, this assumption is no longer valid, for the IP address of a user (person) on a mobile
_____________________________
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device connected to a wireless network, changes as he moves from one subnet to another. Let us
briefly consider the implications. Suppose Alice and Bob are two users on laptops connected to a
wireless network, who communicate with each other via an instant-messaging application; many
such applications exist, such as ICQ1 and AOL Instant Messenger.2 As Bob walks around and
switches subnets, his IP address changes. The application’s directory is unaware of this change.
When Alice sends Bob a message, the directory unsuccessfully attempts to route it to Bob’s old
IP address. We use a simplistic model of an instant-messaging application, but this example
emphasizes the general problem that exists. The directory cannot support mobility.
With the growth of the Internet, more users want to be online. The advent of wireless
networking for laptops fueled the desire to be online from anywhere at anytime. This trend will
increase dramatically as it becomes easier to connect the millions of Personal Digital Assistants
(PDAs) to the Internet. People want their PDAs and laptops to be like cellular phones; online
while on the go.
The advent of wireless networks has enhanced mobility, but led to trouble because IP
addresses are no longer fixed. The network breaks, because the Application and Transport layers
typically assume a stable IP layer. Research on Mobile IP attempts to handle IP changes in the IP
layer, and IPv6 promises to support a similar scheme [1]. Some applications have been modified
to detect and deal with IP address changes in the Application layer. But Mobile IP is rarely
deployed, is inadequate for many applications, and IPv6 will not be deployed for years, if ever.
The instant-messaging application example illustrates the kind of problems encountered
due to changing IP addresses of clients on wireless networks. Instant-messaging, text-chat, Voiceover-IP (VOIP), and videoconferencing applications enable users to communicate with one
another in real-time. For these applications to service mobility, clients must obtain the most
current IP addresses of other clients, quickly.

1
2

http://www.icq.com/
http://www.aol.com/aim/
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G. Ayorkor Mills-Tettey, also at Dartmouth, designed Mobile Voice-over-IP (MVOIP)
[2]. Her design allows clients to recognize an IP address change during an active VOIP
conversation, to obtain the new IP address of the other party, and to continue the call. This paper
focuses on the other problem associated with changing IP addresses: obtaining the most current
IP address of a client when trying to establish a new connection. We design and implement a
hierarchical directory structure that keeps track of clients’ IP address changes. Each user has an
alias (or user name) with the directory. A client wishing to connect to a mobile user’s client,
queries the directory, by name, for the most recent IP address of that user’s client. Our goal is for
the design to be robust, scalable, and secure.
Though designed originally to support MVOIP, our directory is really a tool for locating
mobile people; people who move from one machine to another using machines that may or may
not be mobile devices. User mobility [3] is the ability for a user to maintain the same identity on
different terminals (machines) or terminal types, while terminal mobility [3] is the ability for a
terminal to change physical location. Bob may not move physically, but may move from his
desktop to his laptop to his PDA, maintaining his identity on the different types of machines (user
mobility), his IP address changing on every move. Bob can then walk with his PDA – terminal
mobility – while using a network service. Since our directory associates IP addresses with people,
and not with machines, it keeps the most current IP address of Bob. Therefore, the directory
provides service mobility – the ability for a user to obtain a particular service independent of user
and terminal mobility. The directory can also be used to keep track of the IP address for mobile
objects such as robots, for an application service provided on a mobile device, or for a mobile
agent implementing a service.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we elaborate on the overall design of the
directory infrastructure, looking at some of our design decisions and the reasons for them. Section
3 discusses the protocols of communication between the components of the directory during
normal operation. Section 4 details how the directory is tolerant to failures. We describe
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extensions that make the system secure in Section 5. We briefly discuss the implementation of a
prototype of the directory in Section 6. Section 7 is a discussion of the pros and cons of our
approach. Section 8 compares our model to existing directory service models. Section 9 outlines
further work that we plan to pursue to improve this model. In Section 10, we draw conclusions.

2

Design
Locating clients that have a changing IP address is a challenge in wireless networks. The

goal of our model is to provide a means to quickly obtain the most current IP address of a mobile
client, knowing only the name of its user, without compromising the security of the network, and
ensuring privacy of users. Communicating with mobile users should be as simple as sending an email. Our model is designed to scale to several thousand users, securely, and with tolerance of
failures.
Figure 1 illustrates the general layout of the directory. We discuss each component of the
example in Figure 1.

Central Database
The central database contains the user names of all users registered to use the services
provided by this directory. Each user is assigned a unique user name. Many institutions already
maintain a database of all registered users of their network. Although our prototype uses a simple
database for this feature, our architecture accommodates the use of any similar database through
an appropriate protocol.

Master Server
At the top level of this directory service is the Master server. The Master authenticates
users that wish to use the service, either to allow other users to find them, or to look up other
users. It knows the number of clients registered (logged into) with the system. The Master server
also contains a list of the IP addresses of all Agent servers that operate below it.
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Master Server
Ammar
Dave
Ayorkor
Alice
Bob

1
3
9
7
6

…

Agent 1
1
7

Central Database
Alice
Ammar
Ayorkor
Bob
Dave
John
…

Agent 2

129.170.11.2
129.170.44.1
…

3
6

Agent 3

129.170.16.4
129.170.79.9
…

9

129.170.20.3
…

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

Ammar 1

Alice 7

Bob 6

Dave 3

Ayorkor 9

Figure 1: Layout of Directory

Agents
Under the Master server operate numerous Agent servers, simply called Agents.3
Agents register with the Master server when they start up. Each Agent maintains the
current IP addresses of a small subset of registered mobile clients. Our expectation is that
one Master server cannot handle the IP address updates from all clients, so the Master
delegates and distributes this responsibility among several Agents.
3

The name “Agent” was chosen by loose analogy to the “agents” in Mobile IP or SNMP, and bears no
relation to the use of that term in the “intelligent agents” or “mobile agents” communities.
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Clients
Clients represent users registered with the directory service. The Master pairs each client
with an Agent. The client is then visible to other clients, via the directory, and it can query the
directory for the current IP address of other clients.

3

Communication during normal operation
This section shows how the different components of this service interact during normal

operation. A network administrator starts the Master server. The Master is at a well-known IP
address (or has a well-known hostname) and has “well-known” ports for registering Agents and
clients with the system.
In the following discussion, we use the following notation to signify the contents of a
message sent from one component of the directory to another: X→Y: (A, B, C, …). This notation
means that X sends a message to Y with contents A, B, and C. We refer to the initiator of a
communication channel, be it voice, video, or data, as the caller, and the client that receives the
request from a caller, the callee.

3.1

Agents registering with the Master
The number of Agents in the system is proportional to the system load. A network

administrator, however, must make the choice of the number of Agents to use, and he starts an
Agent manually. The system has the flexibility that Agents can be added to it at any time, even
when the system is already running. Therefore, we provide a mechanism for an Agent to inform
the Master server that it is running and the Master can assign it clients.
An Agent knows the IP address of the Master server. When an Agent starts, it opens a
TCP connection to the Master on the known Agent-Registration port. The registration request is,
Agent→Master: (Agent IP address, Clients’ Port, Agent-Query-Port, Logout-Port). The field
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“Clients’ Port” is the port where the Agent listens for IP-update packets (see Section 3.3) from
clients. The Master server forwards this port number to clients when they register (see Section
3.2). The Master forwards a request for an IP address of a client to the Agent-Query-Port. Clients
notify the Agent on the Logout-Port when they logout (see Section 3.5).
When the Master receives this message, it adds the Agent’s information in its list of
Agents, and sends a message, Master→Agent: (Agent ID, Master-Heartbeat-Port). We describe
the use of the Master-Heartbeat-Port in Section 4.1. The Agent ID is a unique integer assigned by
the Master. A crashed Agent is assigned the same ID when it is restarted, provided it has its old
IP address. Figure 2 depicts the protocol.

Master
(Agent 3 IP, Clients’ Port,
Agent-Query-Port, Logout-Port)
(Agent ID, Master-Heartbeat-Port)
Agent 1

Agent 2

Agent 3

Figure 2: An Agent (Agent 3) registering with Master

3.2

Clients registering with the Service
A user wishing to use the service to communicate with other users must first register his

client with the directory service. The client knows the IP address (or at least the host name) of the
Master server. The client makes a TCP connection to the well-known Client-Registration port on
the Master server and sends a message, Client→ Master (user name). The Master listens on
different ports for Agent and client registrations.
The Master server checks for errors upon receiving the registration request. It sends a
“User Not Found” error to the client if the supplied user name is not in the central database. In the
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extreme case that no Agent server is running, the Master server sends the client the error, “No
Agent Running.”
If the abovementioned errors do not occur, the Master registers the user’s client. The
Master first maps the user name to a new, unique integer ID. It then hashes the client (using its
ID) to an Agent, thereby assigning the client an Agent. The Master knows how many Agents are
running. Moreover, the Master assigns the client IDs sequentially. We use a simple hash function:
Agent ID = (Client ID) mod (Number of Agents)
The Master also keeps a counter for each Agent that tells how many clients are assigned to each
Agent. The Master increments the counter of the Agent assigned to the client.
The Master stores the client’s ID and the ID of the client’s Agent in its dictionary of
clients, using the unique user name as the key. The Master server then replies to the client with a
confirmation message, Master→Client: (Client-ID, Master-Query-Port, Master-Logout-Port,
Agent IP, Agent Port, Agent-Logout-Port). The client needs all of this information. The Master
listens on the Master-Query-Port for requests for IP addresses of users’ clients, i.e., queries of the
form, “What is the current IP address of Alice?” The Master listens on the Master-Logout-Port
for logout requests from clients. The client’s Agent listens on the Agent Port for IP-update
packets (described below). The Agent listens on the Agent-Logout-Port for logout requests from
its clients.
We chose different ports for different message types, rather than one port with different
message types. This approach frees the Master and Agents of checking the message type before
processing a message. This simplicity becomes important when Agents need to process a
thousand packets every minute. Dedicated ports process messages faster, at the expense of using
more of the port-number space on their host.
Figure 3 depicts the client registration process.
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Ammar’s ID is 11. There
are 3 Agents. His Agent is
11%3 = 2. Agent 2’s IP is
129.170.90.3. Agent 2 is
listening on port 9090 for
IP-updates and on port 9091
for logout requests.
Is ‘Ammar’ in the
database?
2
Master
3

4
(11, Master-Query-Port,
Master-Logout-Port,
129.170.90.3, 9090, 9091)

Central
Database

Yes, he is.

1

Register me. My
user name is
Ammar.

Ammar

Figure 3: The Client registration process

3.3

Updating of Client IPs
When a client registers with the service, the Master assigns it an Agent. Clients send their

current IP address to their assigned Agent every minute, Client→Agent: (Client ID, Current IP
Address, Client-Listening-Port, Subnet-Count4), as Figure 4 shows.
When a client registers with the service, the Master server does not inform the client’s
Agent of the assignment. After receiving its Agent’s IP address, the client immediately sends it an
IP-update packet. The client’s first IP-update packet serves to notify the Agent that it has
registered and been assigned to that Agent. Of course, it also serves to tell the Agent the current
IP address of the client. As client IDs are unique, when an Agent receives the first IP-update
4

The “Subnet-Count” field is explained in section 5.2.3.

9

Agent
(Client ID, Current IP,
Client-Listening-Port, Subnet-Count)

Client
Figure 4: Client sending IP-update packet

packet, it does not have any information associated with the client’s ID. The Agent adds an entry
in its dictionary for this client. This approach enables the Agent to discriminate between new
clients, and clients that are merely updating their IP address. This distinction becomes important
when a crashed Agent is restarted (see Section 5.2.3).
There are two benefits of periodic IP-update packets: the Agents have the most current IP
address of each client, and they know if a client is still functional. An Agent records the
timestamps of the last IP-update packet received from each client. If a particular client has not
sent an IP-update packet for the past three minutes, the Agent assumes that the client is no longer
registered (possibly due to the client crashing or the user’s machine crashing), or no longer
reachable on the network, and removes the client from its tables.
If, however, a client changes subnets, its IP address changes. As soon as the client obtains
the new IP address, it immediately sends an IP-update packet with the new IP address. This
ensures that the directory service has the current IP addresses of all clients.

3.4

Obtaining a Callee’s IP address
The purpose of this service is to obtain the current IP address of a user’s client, knowing

only the user name. Suppose Alice and Bob, mobile users on laptops, register with the service.
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Alice now wishes to talk to Bob, for which she needs his client’s IP address. Alice’s client sends
a message to the Master-Query-Port, Client→Master: (Callee’s user name, Caller’s IP address,
IP-Request-Reply-Port, Caller’s ID). Alice’s client starts to listen on the IP-Request-Reply-Port
for a reply. It waits for one minute after which it times out and assumes that Bob is unavailable.
The Master replies to the caller, Alice’s client, on the caller-specified IP address and port
number (IP-Request-Reply-Port) with a “User Not Found” error if the callee’s user, Bob, is not a
valid user. If the callee is not registered, the Master server sends the caller a “Callee Not
Registered” error message. Otherwise, it obtains the information about the callee from its
dictionary of clients, using the name of the callee’s user as the key. The Master forwards the IPrequest to the callee’s Agent, through the Agent’s Agent-Query-Port: Master→Agent: (Callee’s
ID, Caller’s IP address, IP-Request-Reply-Port).
Upon receiving this message, the Agent looks in its dictionary for the specified client ID.
If the ID is not found, it means that the callee is no longer registered with the system and so the
Agent sends an error message, “Callee Not Registered,” to the caller, and not to the Master.
When the Agent finds the ID, it obtains the IP address of the callee and replies to the
caller (Alice’s client) at the caller-specified IP and port: Agent→Client: (Callee’s Current IP
address, Callee’s Client-Listening-Port5). This completes the protocol for obtaining an IP address
of a user’s client. The caller can now initiate communication with the callee, independent of the
directory. Figure 5 shows the protocol.

3.5

Clients Logging Out

Clients should inform the directory when they logout of the service, so that all information about
them is deleted from the directory. When the client logs out, it sends a Logout message to its

5

See Section 3.3 for an explanation of the Client-Listening-Port.
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Master

(Callee’s user name (‘Bob’), Caller’s IP address,
IP-Request-Reply-Port, Caller’s ID)
Caller

Step 1: Caller sends an IP-request to the Master

Does the user
name ‘Bob’
exist?

Master

(Callee’s user name)

Central
Database

Yes, ‘Bob’ is
a valid user.

Step 2: The Master queries the Database for the validity of the Callee

Master

Bob’s client is registered. I must
forward Bob’s ID, 2, to Bob’s Agent,
along with Alice’s client’s IP and
port.

(Callee’s ID, Caller’s IP address, IP-Request-Reply-Port)
Callee’s
Agent
Step 3: The Master forwards the IP-request to Callee’s Agent
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Caller

(Callee’s Current IP, Callee’s Client-Listening-Port)

Callee’s
Agent

I know the IP address and ClientListening-Port of the callee that
has an ID of 2. I must forward that
to the address that the Master
specified.

Step 4: Callee’s Agent sends the Caller, Callee’s IP and port
Caller

Callee
Do you wish to
communicate?
Step 5: Caller initiates a request to communicate with Callee
Figure 5: A successful IP address lookup

Agent and to the Master: Client→Agent: (Client ID) and Client→Master: (Client user name)
(Figure 6). The Master decrements the counters of the total number of registered clients, and of
the number of clients assigned to the client’s Agent.
Master
(Client user name)

Client

(Client ID)
Agent

Figure 6: The Client Logout Process
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4

Error handling and recovering from failures
Section 3 elaborates the communication protocols in the light of normal operation. This

section relaxes the assumption that each component operates perfectly. The above discussion
identifies some errors that the Master or Agents can detect. This section discusses failure
recovery. We explore possible failures and how the system recovers from them.

4.1

Agent Heartbeats
Agents are servers that are prone to failures, of course. If an Agent (or its host machine)

crashes, we lose the IP addresses of all clients assigned to that Agent. Hence, the crashed Agent’s
clients are now unreachable. We need a mechanism to ensure that if an Agent crashes, we know
which Agent crashed, and we do not lose any client information. Our goal is to survive the failure
of a single Agent. A second failure before the first Agent is replaced, may result in loss of client
information, but should be unlikely.
To detect that an Agent crashed, and specifically which Agent crashed, Agents send
“heartbeat” packets to the Master every minute. This packet contains the IP address and the ID of
the Agent, so the Master knows which Agent sent the packet. The Master server records the
timestamp of the latest heartbeat received from each Agent. If any timestamp becomes older than
three minutes, the Master assumes that the Agent has crashed, and no longer assigns clients to the
non-functional Agent.
The directory must not lose any client information due to Agent failures. Thus, each
client is assigned two Agents, which both have the information about that client. The probability
that both Agents of a client are non-functional at the same time is significantly lower than if only
one Agent maintained the client’s information.
When a client registers with the system, the Master assigns the client two Agents (the
exact algorithm is discussed in the next section). The Master communicates the Agents’ IP
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addresses to the client, Master→Client: (Client-ID, Master-Query-Port, Master-Logout-Port, 1st
Agent IP, 1st Agent Port, 1st Agent-Logout-Port, 2nd Agent IP, 2nd Agent Port, 2nd Agent-LogoutPort).
The Master server may need three minutes to realize that an Agent has crashed. The
Master could, unfortunately, assign new clients to the crashed Agent during this “three-minute
blind window.” This poses no problems, as clients are assigned two Agents, and we assume, with
high probability, that the other Agent is functioning.

4.2

Client Heartbeats
Clients send periodic IP-update packets to their Agents (see Section 3.3). A client sends

identical IP-update packets to both of its Agents, ensuring that both Agents have its updated
information (Figure 7).
The client IP-update packets serve to update the client’s IP address with its Agents, and
serve as a heartbeat. An Agent records the timestamp of the last IP-update packet received from
each client. If the timestamp is more than three minutes old, the Agent assumes that the client has
crashed and deletes all information about that client.
Agent 1

Agent 2
(Client ID, Current IP,
Client-Listening-Port,
Subnet-Count)

Client
Figure 7: A Client updating its IP with two Agents
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The Master does not need notification from Agents about crashed clients. When the
Master receives an IP-request for a crashed client, it forwards the request to one of the client’s
Agents. The crashed client’s Agent, however, has deleted all information about the client, and so
replies to the caller with a “Client Not Registered” error message. When the client re-registers,
the Master assigns it a new ID and “new” Agents, and overwrites the old information about the
client with the new information. This is a desirable behavior even if the user is registered from
another client and is registering from a new client, for the current IP address of the user is no
longer the IP address of the “old” client. If the user returns to his old client, he must register with
the service again.
If one of a client’s Agents crashes, the client does not know that the Agent has crashed
(we use UDP to send IP-update packets). It does not need to know this; it can continually send IPupdate packets to the crashed Agent. We can be reasonably sure that the other Agent is still
functional, and so the client is updating its IP address with the directory, successfully. If a client
loses one Agent, or is assigned a dead Agent, it never notices, and continues to use the same IP
address of the dead Agent. As a result, the crashed Agent must be restarted with its old IP
address, otherwise we are vulnerable to failure of the second Agent.
When the crashed Agent is restarted, it suddenly starts to receive IP-update packets from
its original clients. It treats those IP-update packets as first IP-update packets of “new clients” that
are just registering and thereby rebuilds its tables of client information.

4.3

Agent-Assignment Process
When a client registers with the system, the Master assigns it two Agents. Section 3.2

discusses how the Master selects an Agent for a new client. The hash function is:
Agent ID = (Client ID) mod (Number of Agents)
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This serves as the first Agent of the client. This Agent, however, may be a crashed Agent. The
Master knows, with reasonable accuracy, which Agents are functional and which are not. If the
Agent obtained from the hash function is functional, it becomes the first Agent of the client. If the
Agent is non-functional, the Master chooses another Agent using the function:
1st Agent = (Agent ID + 1) mod (Number of Agents)
where Agent ID is the non-functional Agent obtained from the original hash function. If 1st
Agent is a non-functional Agent, the Master repeats the same process; otherwise, it becomes
the first Agent of the client. The same function is then applied to obtain the second Agent of the
client:
2nd Agent = (1st Agent + 1) mod (Number of Agents).
The Master repeats this process, as it did when finding the first Agent, until it obtains a functional
second Agent for the client. The Master records the Agents assigned to the client. As mentioned
above, the probability that both Agents assigned to the client are both in the “three-minute blind
window” of the Master is very low.
When the Master detects an Agent crash, it does not assign any clients to the Agent.
When the Agent comes up, however, it has fewer clients assigned to it than the other Agents,
assuming that clients registered while the Agent was non-functional. To ensure a balanced
distribution of clients to Agents, the Master assigns the “new” Agent as the first Agent for new
clients until the “new” Agent has roughly the same load as the other Agents. The Master employs
a different technique to pick the second Agent for a new client. The Master starts from the 0 th
Agent and assigns the ith Agent, the ith new client that registers after the “new” Agent starts
running, skipping the “new” Agent. This ensures that other Agents also get a balanced load of the
new clients. Other probabilistic algorithms can be used to ensure a balanced load, especially since
our model cannot handle multiple “new” Agents simultaneously.
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5

Security and Authentication
Wireless networks are especially prone to malicious attacks. To make the directory

service “safe” from such attacks we take some measures to provide security and authentication.
The components must mutually authenticate one another, which makes it impossible to pose as
the Master, as an Agent or as a client for a user. Our goal is to make it difficult for an intruder to
match a user name to an IP address without authenticating himself and making an explicit query.
We use Kerberos [4] for authentication and encryption, and therefore our service requires
synchronized clocks (within a few minutes [5]) on the wireless LAN.
Section 5.1 discusses how the components mutually authenticate one another. Section 5.2
focuses on the security and privacy issues and what we do to ensure secrecy and integrity of all
communication between the components of the directory. Section 5.3 highlights various cases in
which a malicious intruder may try to get around the security measures, and how the system
thwarts such attempts.

5.1

Authentication
We mutually authenticate all parties involved in this service. This section explains how

we use Kerberos to authenticate clients and Agents with the Master, and clients with Agents.
When Agents and clients register with the service, they mutually authenticate themselves
with the Master. The Master server obtains a Kerberos ticket6 when the Master server starts
running. Figure 8 is a depiction of how a client or an Agent authenticates itself with the Master
server before registration. The Master can be an Agent as well in this diagram.
We now elaborate the messages exchanged [6]. The notation is as follows: K stands for a
key, T stands for a ticket, and A stands for an authenticator (which is a timestamp). To represent
that a datum X is encrypted with a key K, we write: {X}K.
6

A ticket is a proof of identity, and is used for authentication.
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KDC

1

2
3

Client

TGS
4
6

5
Master

Figure 8: Kerberos Authentication Process before a Client/Agent registers

Messages 1 & 2: The client obtains a Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Key Distribution
Center (KDC).
1:

Client→KDC: (user name)
The client attempts to obtain a TGT from the KDC.

2:

KDC→Client: ({KClient/TGS, {TClient/TGS}K TGS}KUser)
The KDC returns to the client a TGT, TClient/TGS, encrypted with the Ticket-Granting
Service’s (TGS) secret key, and a session key to use with the TGS, KClient/TGS. The whole
message is encrypted with the secret key of the client’s user.

Messages 3 & 4: The client obtains a ticket to register with the Master server.
3:

Client→TGS: (Master, {TClient/TGS}K

, {AClient}KClient/TGS)

TGS

The client decrypts message 2 with KUser, the password of the client’s user. The client
then asks the TGS for a ticket to authenticate itself with the Master, presenting the TGT
and a constructed authenticator, AClient, (to prevent replay attacks), as proof of identity.
4:

TGS→Client: ({KClient/Master, {TClient/Master}KMaster}KClient/TGS)
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The TGS sends back to the client a session key for communication between the client and
the Master, KClient/Master, and a ticket for the Master, TClient/Master, encrypted with the Master’s
secret key, all encrypted with the Client/TGS session key, KClient/TGS.
Messages 5 & 6: The client asks the Master server to allow it to register.
5:

Client→Master: ({TClient/Master}KMaster, {AClient}KClient/Master)
The client decrypts Message 4 using KClient/TGS and then presents T Client/Master and a
constructed authenticator, AClient, as a proof of identity. The session key, KClient/Master, is
contained in the ticket TClient/Master. Hence, the Master can obtain it.

6:

Master→Client: ({AMaster}KClient/Master)
The Master sends the client a constructed authenticator, AMaster, to prove to the client that
it is in fact communicating with the Master server.

This message exchange completes the mutual authentication between the client and the Master
server. The process for an Agent registering with the Master server is identical, as is the process
of a client authenticating itself to its Agents.
The client can now communicate with the Master under the covers of the session key,
K Client/Master, and can register securely. All communication between the Master and the client is
encrypted with the session key. Similarly, all communication between an Agent and the Master,
or a client, is encrypted with a session key.
For security purposes, we require that a user wishing to know the IP address of a user’s
client, register with the system, and thus authenticate himself via Kerberos. We realize, however,
that PDAs have limited resources in terms of processing power. PDAs do not have the ability to
execute the computation-intensive client-side Kerberos code. We can employ Charon [6], a
proxy-based Kerberos authentication model developed by Armando Fox and Steven Gribble at
the University of California, Berkeley, for authenticating users on PDAs.
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5.2

Security and Privacy
This section covers the protocols we detail in Section 3 from the point of view of privacy.

As we show in Section 5.1, all protocols are encrypted, providing some privacy. Below, we detail
how that encryption is used, and identify the limits to privacy protection in our system.

5.2.1 Agents registering with the Master
After an Agent authenticates itself with the Master server, it has a session key, KAgent/Master,
for communicating with the Master. The Master server records these session keys, along with the
other information about the Agent. The Agent sends a request to the Master to register,
Agent→Master: ({Agent IP address, Clients’ Port, Agent-Query-Port, Logout-Port}KAgent/Master).
The Master assigns an ID to the Agent and replies to the Agent, Master→Agent: ({Agent ID,
Master-Heartbeat-Port} KAgent/Master). Figure 9 illustrates the protocol with encryption.

5.2.2

Client Registration
Once a client authenticates itself with the Master, the Master and the client share a

session key, KClient/Master. The client registers with a message, Client→Master: ({user
Master
({Agent ID, Master-Heartbeat-Port}KAgent/Master)

Agent 1

Agent 2

({Agent IP, Clients’ Port,
Agent-Query-Port,
Logout-Port}KAgent/Master)

Agent 3

Figure 9: Agent registering with Master using Encryption

name}KClient/Master ). The Master assigns two Agents to the client, and registers the client,
Master→Client: ({Client-ID, Master-Query-Port, Master-Logout-Port, 1st Agent IP, 1st Agent
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Port, 1st Agent-Logout-Port, 2nd Agent IP, 2nd Agent Port, 2nd Agent-Logout-Port}KClient/Master).
Should someone sniffing the network obtain these messages, he is unable to decrypt them, as only
the Master and the client know the session key.
The KDC contacts the network’s database to validate a user before issuing a TGT to the
user’s client. The Master, therefore, does not need to validate the user by contacting the database.
Hence, Steps 2 and 3 in Figure 3 are redundant. This does not make the central database
redundant though, for the Master still needs to validate a callee’s user name on an IP-request (see
Step 2 of Figure 5). Figure 10 illustrates the modified client registration protocol with encryption.
The Master server stores the session key for each client, along with the client’s ID.

Ammar’s ID is 11. The
session key is KAmmar/Master.
Ammar is hashed to Agents
1 and 2.

Master
({11, Master-Query-Port,
Master-Logout-Port, 1st Agent
IP, 1st Agent Port, 1st AgentLogout-Port, 2nd Agent IP,
2ndAgent Port, 2nd Agent-LogoutPort}KAmmar/Master)

Ammar

Register me. My
user name is
Ammar.

Figure 10: A successful Client registration with Encryption

5.2.3 Updating of Client IPs
A client must authenticate itself to its Agents before it begins to send IP-updates. The
client obtains a session key to use with each Agent, KClient/Agent, as Figure 8 depicts. The session
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key with one Agent is different from the one with the other Agent. Once the client authenticates
itself with both Agents, it proceeds to send IP-update packets to its Agents, Client→Agent-1:
(Client ID, {Current IP, Client-Listening-Port, Subnet-Count}KClient/Agent-1) and Client→Agent-2:
(Client ID, {Current IP, Client-Listening-Port, Subnet-Count}KClient/Agent-2) (Figure 11). An Agent
records the session key it has with each client. When it receives an IP-update packet, it can tell
which session key to use to decrypt the rest of the packet based on the ID in the packet.
The IP-update packet contains a field, “Subnet-Count,” which is a counter (initialized to
0) that keeps track of how many times a client has changed subnets (and hence its IP address).
Whenever a client changes subnets, it increments this counter.
For efficiency, the Agents do not decrypt every IP-update packet they receive. Each
Agent records the IP address and the encrypted part of the IP-update packet (see Figure 11) of
each client. An Agent determines which client sent an IP-update packet by looking at the

Agent 1

Agent 2

(Client ID, {Current IP,
Client-Listening-Port,
Subnet-Count} KClient/Agent-1)

(Client ID, {Current IP,
Client-Listening-Port,
Subnet-Count} KClient/Agent-2)
Client

Figure 11: A Client updating its IP with its Agents using Encryption

plaintext “Client ID” field in the packet. It then compares (bit wise comparison) the encrypted
part of the packet with the encrypted part that it has stored for the particular client. If the two
ciphers are identical, then the client’s IP address has not changed since the last IP-update packet
(and neither has its subnet-count) and the Agent can disregard the packet without performing the
expensive operation of decryption. If the two ciphers differ in even one bit, the Agent decrypts
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the packet and updates its record of the IP address, subnet-count, and ciphertext of the particular
client. This approach minimizes decryption operations to whenever a client changes subnets. A
client employs a similar technique. Clients store the cipher, {Current IP, Client-Listening-Port,
Subnet Count}KClient/Agent. If a client’s IP address is the same as it was when it sent the last IPupdate packet, the client merely replays this cipher. When the client’s IP address changes, it
encrypts its new IP address and the incremented subnet-count, and stores the new cipher.
Since this system is capable of recovering from failures, we ensure that it does so without
the loss of security. When an Agent crashes, the Master is able to tell which Agent has crashed
and is able to adjust accordingly. When a failed Agent is restarted, it starts to receive IP-update
packets from its clients. Note that the IP address of each client in these packets is encrypted with
a unique session key that was established for communication between the Agent and the
respective client. The Agent lost the session keys when it crashed. Obtaining new session keys for
each client is inefficient due to the number of clients. We propose a more efficient solution to this
problem.
When the client registered with the Agent, it obtained, from the TGS, a session key with
the Agent, KClient/Agent, as well as a ticket for the Agent that contained this session key,
{TClient/Agent}KAgent (see Message 4 in Section 5.1). The client caches this ticket, which is encrypted
with the Agent’s secret key. When a restarted Agent receives an IP-update packet, it checks if it
has an entry for that client (using the plaintext client ID from the packet). The Agent sends a TCP
error message to the client if it does not have its entry (and hence the session key) in its tables,
requesting the client to re-send the encrypted ticket, {TClient/Agent}KAgent. The Agent obtains the IP
address of the client from the IP Layer. The Agent already knows the default port where the client
is listening for requests of this nature. The client complies by sending the cached ticket to the
Agent, who decrypts it with its secret key and obtains the old session key.
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5.2.4 Obtaining a Callee’s IP Address
The caller uses the session key, K Caller/Master (see Section 5.2.2), to encrypt its IP-request,
thus ensuring privacy, Caller→Master: (Caller’s ID, {Callee’s user name, Caller’s IP address, IPRequest-Reply-Port}KCaller/Master). The Master looks up the session key it has with the caller (using
the plaintext caller ID from the message), and decrypts the rest of the message. The Master
selects a functional Agent of the callee and forwards the request to that Agent, Master→CalleeAgent: ({Callee’s ID, Caller’s IP address, IP-Request-Reply-Port, KCaller/Master}K Master/Callee-Agent).
This message differs slightly from its description in Section 3.4: it has the Caller/Master session
key. We explain its significance shortly.
The Agent decrypts the message it gets from the Master, looks up the IP address of the
callee, and replies to the caller, Agent→Caller: ({Callee’s Current IP address, Callee’s ClientListening-Port}KCaller/Master). Since the caller knows its session key with the Master, it decrypts the
message.
The callee’s Agent may not necessarily be the caller’s Agent. Therefore, the replying
Agent may not have a session key established with the caller. Instead of obtaining a new session
key or obtaining the caller’s session key from its Agent, the callee’s Agent poses as the Master
server. The Master sends the session key, KCaller/Master, to the callee’s Agent, who encrypts the IP
address of the callee with this key and then sends the reply to the caller. The caller thinks the
Master server is directly responding to its request. Note that the Master encrypts the message sent
to the Agent with KMaster/Callee-Agent. Therefore, the caller’s session key with the Master is not
compromised. Agents are trusted elements once they have authenticated themselves with the
Master server. Figure 12 illustrates the protocol.
We can extend our protocol to provide a ticket for the callee so that caller-callee
authentication is possible. The Master can generate a ticket for the callee and forward it to the
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Agent, who can then include the ticket in its reply to the caller. The Master can generate a ticket
such as, {{Caller’s name, Caller’s IP, Caller’s Port, Timestamp}KCallee/Master}KCaller/Master.
Master

(Caller’s ID, {Callee’s user name (‘Bob’),
Caller’s IP address, IP-Request-ReplyPort}KCaller/Master)
Caller
Step 1: Caller sends an IP-request to the Master
Does the username ‘Bob’
exist?
(Callee’s user name (‘Bob’))
Master

Central
Database

Yes, ‘Bob’ is
a valid user.
Step 2: The Master queries the Database for the validity of the Callee

Master

Callee, Bob, is registered. I must
forward Bob’s ID, 2, to one of Bob’s
Agent, along with Alice’s IP and
port.

({Callee’s ID, Caller’s IP address, IP-Request-Reply-Port,
KCaller/Master}KMaster/Callee-Agent)
Callee’s
Agent

Step 3: The Master forwards the IP-request to one of Callee’s Agent
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({Callee’s Current IP address, Callee’s ClientListening-Port} KCaller/Master)

Caller

Callee’s
Agent

I know the IP address and ClientListening-Port of the callee that
has an ID of 2. I must forward that
to the address that the Master
specified.

Step 4: Callee’s Agent sends the Caller, Callee’s IP and port
Caller

Callee
Do you wish to
communicate?

Step 5: Caller initiates a request to communicate with Callee
Figure 12: A successful IP address lookup with Encryption

5.2.5 Agent Heartbeats
Agents encrypt their IP address in the heartbeat message they send to the Master,
Agent→Master: (Agent ID, {Agent IP address}KAgent/Master). Using the Agent ID in the packet, the
Master is able to retrieve the correct session key that it has with the Agent, to decrypt the IP
address of the Agent.

5.3

Analyzing the privacy measures
This section discusses various ways a malicious intruder can try to eavesdrop on

communication among the components of the directory or pose as one of the components. The
goal is to prevent an eavesdropper from obtaining a client’s IP address, and finding out the user
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name associated with that client, from the messages exchanged between the components. If an
eavesdropper can match a client’s IP address with a user name, he will know the location of the
client’s user.
The use of client IDs, instead of user names, to communicate with the service after the
registration process is a privacy measure, making it harder to learn the identity of a client’s user.
It is also important to make it difficult to determine a user’s location. Since an IP address
determines the subnet, and subnets are often determined by location, we attempt to hide clients’
IP addresses from eavesdroppers.
Since we encrypt the IP address when it appears in the payload of messages, the
eavesdropper cannot obtain it directly from IP-update packets or Agent→Caller messages. As IPupdate packets are sent via UDP, however, the intruder can obtain a client’s IP address from the
UDP header, and the plaintext client ID from the payload. Fortunately, it is impossible for the
intruder to obtain the mapping between client ID and user name, because the user name is
encrypted everywhere it is exchanged. Even a caller, after looking up a callee, is not given the
callee’s ID.
Trudy, a malicious intruder, cannot change the contents of any message because she does
not have the session keys, so she cannot, for example, insert her IP address into an Agent→Caller
message or an IP-update packet. Trudy can, however, modify the plaintext client ID in an IPupdate packet and transmit the “corrupt” packet. This constitutes a denial-of-service attack; if
Trudy changes Alice’s ID in her IP-update packets, her Agents will assume that Alice has logged
out. Moreover, if Trudy changes Alice’s ID to Bob’s ID, in her packets, Bob’s Agents may have
Alice’s IP address for Bob. Fortunately, Agents compare the encrypted IP address in the payload
with the IP address in the UDP header, and disregard the packet if there is a mismatch.
Trudy can register with the service and query it for Alice’s IP address, and hence obtain
Alice’s Agents’ IP addresses. Trudy can then eavesdrop near Alice’s Agents and track changes to
Alice’s IP address. Hence, Trudy can obtain the user name to IP address mapping. The directory
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does expose this mapping, but only to registered users, and only as an explicit query that might be
logged.
Suppose Trudy is an impostor, trying to fake a component of the directory. We consider
seven different cases in which Trudy tries to act as a valid component of the system and how the
system prevents such attacks.
1) Suppose Trudy sniffs the network and obtains an IP-update packet of Alice. Assume that
Alice’s client does not change her IP address and is sending the same IP-update packets.
Trudy begins to replay Alice’s packet, as is. Alice’s Agent receives two identical packets,
one from Alice, and the other from Bob. These extra packets do not change the state of
Alice or the Agent. Trudy cannot change the packet because she does not have the
session key.
2) Now suppose Trudy obtains one of Alice’s IP-update packets and Alice logs out (see
Section 3.5) of the system. Trudy begins to replay Alice’s packet. One of her ex-Agents
believes that Alice registered with the service again, whereas she did not. Suppose
Trudy’s machine obtains the IP address that Alice’s client had, in hopes of receiving calls
for Alice. If an IP-request for Alice comes, the Master determines that Alice is not
registered, and so never forwards the request to Alice’s former Agent. Thus, Trudy is
unable to receive any calls intended for Alice.
3) Trudy’s machine obtains Alice’s IP address and Trudy replays Alice’s IP-update packets
after she logs out. Trudy now tries to make a call to Judy, pretending to be Alice. Trudy
contacts the Master server to obtain the IP address of Judy, Trudy→Master: ({‘Judy’,
Alice’s IP address, IP-Request-Reply-Port}KAlice/Master, Alice’s ID). Trudy, however, needs
the session key, KAlice/Master, which she does not have (in fact the Master does not have it
either after Alice logs out). Therefore, Trudy is unable to encrypt the message and cannot
query the directory for an IP address. Even if Trudy replayed an older IP-request packet
of Alice, the Master does not have the session key of Alice any longer and so disregards
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the request. Although Trudy has faked herself as Alice, she can do no harm. Note that
Alice is not denied service when she registers again, as a new client ID is assigned to her.
4) Trudy obtains one of Alice’s IP-update packets. Suppose Alice’s ID is 12, IP address is
129.170.19.19, and Subnet Count is 3. Alice now switches subnets and her IP address
changes. Her new IP address is 129.170.212.10 and her Subnet Count is now 4. Alice
sends her new IP-update. Trudy replays Alice’s old IP-update packet (Figure 13).
Alice’s Agent compares the encrypted parts of both packets to its stored cipher of
Alice. As Alice’s new packet has a different cipher than the one the Agent has, the Agent
Agent 1
(12, {129.170.19.19, 9090, 3}KAlice/Agent-1)
Alice

(a) Alice in her old subnet
Agent 1
(12, {129.170.19.19, 9090, 3}KAlice/Agent-1)

(12, {129.170.212.10, 9090, 4}KAlice/Agent-1)
Alice

Trudy

(b) Alice in her new subnet and Trudy replaying her old IP-update packet
Figure 13: An impostor replaying an old subnet packet after a Client switches Subnets

decrypts it and observes that the Subnet Count field in the packet has incremented. The
Agent updates its information about Alice. When the Agent decrypts Trudy’s replay, the
Subnet Count is lower than the updated value, and so it disregards the replay. Therefore,
the system subverts Trudy’s attempt to carry a denial-of-service attack.
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When Alice switches subnets, Trudy can trap and discard all of Alice’s new IPupdate packets, obtain Alice’s old IP address and replay Alice’s old packets. Alice’s
Agents think that Alice’s IP address has not changed, and so send Alice’s old IP address
to callers who query the directory for Alice. Hence, Alice is not able to receive any calls.
This denial-of-service attack is a limitation of our system. Similar denial-of-service
attacks are possible, especially if there is no caller-callee authentication.
5) Suppose Alice sends an IP-request to the Master to obtain the IP address of Judy,
Alice→Master: ({‘Judy’, Alice’s IP address, IP-Request-Reply-Port}KAlice/Master, Alice’s
ID), and Trudy obtains this message. Now Trudy replays this message to the Master
(Figure 14).
({‘Judy’, Alice’s IP address, IP-Request-Reply-Port}KAlice/Master,
Alice’s ID)
Master

Trudy

Figure 14: Impostor conducting a replay attack to obtain an IP address

The Master thinks that Alice is asking for Judy’s IP address. It forwards the request to
one of Judy’s Agents. The Agent sends Judy’s IP address to the IP address specified in
the initial request, which is Alice’s IP as Trudy cannot decrypt Alice’s IP-request
message to put her IP address in it, instead of Alice’s. Suppose Alice logged out and
Trudy managed to obtain Alice’s IP address. The Master has no record of Alice and
disregards the request. If Alice’s machine had crashed, the Master has Alice’s
information, so construes the request as valid, and forwards it to one of Judy’s Agents.
Judy’s Agent forwards the request to the specified IP address, and Trudy receives the
reply, Judy-Agent→Trudy: ({Judy’s IP address, Judy’s Client-Listening-Port}KAlice/Master),
as Figure 15 illustrates.
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Judy’s
Agent

({Judy’s IP, Judy’s Client-ListeningPort}KAlice/Master)
Trudy

Figure 15: Impostor obtaining an IP address by a replay attack

Trudy does not, however, know the session key, KAlice/Master, and is unable to decrypt the
reply to obtain Judy’s IP address. Though Trudy successfully posed as Alice, she cannot
initiate any communication with Judy, and any other user for that matter.
6) When an Agent crashes, Trudy might obtain the IP address the Agent had. Trudy then
starts a process to listen for IP-update packets on the port that the crashed Agent was
listening (Figure 16).

Trudy acting
as an Agent
(Client’s ID, {Client’s Current IP,
Client-Listening-Port,
Client Subnet-Count}KClient/Agent)
Client

Figure 16: Impostor acting as an Agent

Trudy receives IP-update packets from clients but she cannot obtain the IP address of
clients from them, because they are encrypted with session keys that the Agent shared
with the respective clients. Hence, Trudy can do no harm.
7) Suppose Trudy obtains Alice’s IP-update packet meant for Agent Y, and Y then crashes.
When Y starts running again, Trudy replays the packet. Y is re-constructing its tables (see
Section 4.2), and so asks Trudy (thinking it is Alice) to re-send the ticket that Alice
obtained from the TGS. Even if Trudy got a hold of the message that the TGS sent to
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Alice originally (Message 4 in Figure 8), Trudy cannot extract the ticket meant for Y,
TAlice/Y, since the message is encrypted with the session key between Alice and the TGS,
KAlice/TGS. Hence, Trudy is unable to comply with Y’s request and Y ignores the replay
packet of Trudy.

We realize that this is not an exhaustive study of all potential cases of a malicious
attacker breaking the security of the system. Nevertheless, we feel that the security features of the
directory handle most “reasonable” ways to attack.

6

Implementation
We developed a prototype of the directory service in C++ using libraries developed by

Equivalence [7]. We did not, however, implement security and authentication features, making
the prototype simpler to implement. We ensure that the components all use different ports. We
chose high numbers for our ports so that the components do no interfere with other applications.
In particular, we ensure that the H-series multimedia protocols (H.323 is one of them) do not use
these port numbers. Since all components use unique port numbers, we can run the Master server,
an Agent and a client on the same machine.
Apart from the agent and client heartbeats (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively), all
communication uses TCP. UDP is better suited for heartbeats because of their frequency and
small payload. Moreover, the packets should reach the destination as quickly as possible –
especially IP-update packets – because of the volatile and time-sensitive nature of the data (client
IP addresses) in them. We can afford to drop a heartbeat packet every now and then (as long as
three packets are not dropped consecutively), but cannot afford to have the IP-updates reaching
Agents with a delay. TCP is used for other communication between the components; namely,
client and Agent registration, and the client IP-request process. If UDP was used for the IP-
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request process, a client might end up waiting forever, not knowing that its IP request got lost. To
avoid this, we would need to implement a timeout mechanism at the Application-layer level. TCP
has a timeout mechanism in the Transport layer and so we rely on that to guarantee message
delivery, at the expense of the higher overhead involved with TCP compared to UDP.
The Master and Agents send error messages to clients when they detect errors.
Master→Client and Agent→Client messages in the implementation include an additional field
called, “Error Code.” If the Master and Agents process requests successfully, the “Error Code”
field is set to “Success.” Otherwise, the “Error Code” contains a description of the error that
occurred, and the other fields are empty (set to zero). This approach simplifies the number of
message types in the directory’s protocols. When a client receives a response, it checks the “Error
Code” field and processes the response accordingly.
The prototype runs only on Windows 2000 machines. The code is portable to Linux, with
slight modifications.

7

Evaluation
This infrastructure is designed, specifically, to be scalable. The number of Agents can be

varied according to the number of users. The system is flexible enough to automatically accept a
new Agent while the system is running. We do not need to stop the system to add another Agent
to it. Our load-balancing algorithm ensures that the Agents have roughly the same number of
clients. Balanced load-distribution is crucial for scalability.
Since Agents are separate entities from the Master, the Agents can be distributed across
subnets in the LAN. This has the advantage of a distributed network load. To localize network
load within subnets, the Agent-assignment algorithm could be changed to factor in the location of
users.

34

The error-handling and failure mechanisms included in the system ensure, to a great
degree, that no client information is lost, provided a crashed Agent is restarted on the same host.
The robustness of the system makes it reliable.
The widely deployed and thoroughly tested Kerberos protocol for authentication and
encryption is the backbone of the system’s security and privacy. Of course, this limits our system
to LANs that have Kerberos deployed. Moreover, machines in the LAN must have approximately
synchronized clocks (a known, but acceptable, limitation of Kerberos).
Though the system works well under many failures, it fails totally if the Master server
crashes. We assume that the Master server never crashes. Ideally, there should be a built-in
mechanism so that the system adapts even when the Master fails.
The model attempts to make the system a secure one. Despite the security features
included in the directory, there is a possibility of a malicious intruder carrying out denial-ofservice attacks (see Section 5.3, Case 4). The mode of attack mentioned in Section 5.3 may be
hard to carry out, but it is worth mentioning.
We acknowledge the fact that this directory cannot scale beyond a LAN. Doing so entails
clients sending UDP packets over long distances to their Agents. To deploy the system
worldwide, we need to come up with a hierarchical name space like the one used for e-mail. The
contents of the directory might live at a well-known hostname in each domain, and then there
could be a simple syntax for identifying users: Ammar.Khalid@phone.dartmouth.edu. The
system scales for a WAN, however, provided Agents are distributed to all geographic parts of the
WAN, so that UDP packets do not traverse long distances, and the Agent-assignment algorithm
factors in locality. An Agent reassignment algorithm and protocol is needed, however, to cater to
clients that move from one part of a WAN to another, so that clients are kept “close” to their
Agents. Moreover, such a protocol is necessary when crashed Agents cannot be restarted with
their old IP address.
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Despite these limitations, we strongly feel that the system is an efficient, scalable, robust,
and secure one to deploy in wireless networks.

8

Related Work
This section explores other directory service models that exist, and shows how and why

the model we propose is better suited to support service mobility.

8.1

The Dartmouth Name Directory
The Dartmouth Name Directory (DND) [8] stores information about all registered users

of the Dartmouth Network, and can authenticate users with a secure-password protocol. It uses a
single server and a TCP-based protocol. The DND architecture, however, assumes that a client
does not contact the server frequently, at least not at the rate of once every minute. To support
mobility, our model requires that each client updates its IP address at least once every minute (see
Section 3.3 for when the IP address is updated sooner than one minute). The DND model is not
scalable to support mobile users on clients that send packets every minute. One server cannot
efficiently process thousands of packets every minute. To achieve scalability, we extend the
centralized model by adding Agents. Assume a network of 10,000 users, 40% of whom are
registered at any time (4000 clients), and each client updates one of ten Agents, instead of two
Agents. Assume a 56-byte IP-update packet (40 bytes for headers). Each Agent then receives
4000*56/10*60 = 373 bytes per second. A single-server model entails 373*10 = 3730
bytes per second at the server. Clearly, as the number of registered users becomes large, a single
server, such as the DND, becomes overloaded.
As each Agent caters to a subset of clients, and we can add more Agents as needed, no
single Agent is overloaded. The Master server can then operate under the same assumptions as
the DND server. The Master server only registers clients, and receives and forwards IP-requests
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to an appropriate Agent. The frequency of communication with the Master server is similar to that
with the DND server.
Another difference between the two models lies in the way authentication is done. A
DND command is a two-step process; namely, the client sends the request to the DND server,
which then sends a reply asking for the client’s user to authenticate himself. Not only does a user
authenticate himself every time his client issues a command to the DND server, but the latter
allows lookups without authentication. For efficiency reasons, we feel that authentication should
be the first step in the process, and should only be done once. The server should only begin to
process a client’s request after the client’s user has been authenticated, for if authentication fails,
the server can disregard the request. For these reasons, we chose to use Kerberos as an
authentication mechanism in our model. In our model, therefore, a user authenticates only once,
and his client cannot issue any requests until it has valid tickets for the service.
Another concern, especially on wireless networks, is privacy. The DND server sends
replies (which contain users’ information) in clear text. Replies from our directory service mostly
consist of IP addresses, which are an indicator of a user’s location. For privacy purposes,
therefore, we cannot afford to have the service send replies in plaintext. Kerberos session keys are
used to encrypt every network packet that is sent and received, thereby ensuring secrecy and
integrity.
Though the DND model is clearly inappropriate for our purpose, it can be incorporated
into our design. We can employ the DND as the central database, using the DND protocol. We
would need to add encryption to this communication.

8.2

Domain Name System
The Domain Name System (DNS) [9] is a hierarchical, distributed database of hostname

to IP address mappings. If each mobile host is assigned a hostname, then we could use the DNS
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for looking up IP addresses of mobile hosts. This solution poses a problem. The DNS would need
updating whenever a mobile host’s IP address changed. For a small number of mobile hosts, this
approach might work. It is not, however, scalable. Moreover, it would require assigning a
hostname to every mobile host, and it would assume a user has a hostname; both are uncommon
in a DHCP world, and the latter limits the possibility of a user using different mobile hosts. A
central server would be needed to distribute session keys to ensure security. Doing this for a
widely distributed database can be a challenge. Our model overcomes these difficulties, hence
providing scalable and secure support to mobile users.
IP address lookups in our system resemble DNS queries. Most DNS servers handle
queries recursively: when a server does not have the requested information, it forwards the
request to another server. That server may forward it to yet another server, recursively. In our
system, we have one level of forwarding, which is sufficient for our desired scalability.
Despite these differences, there are some features of the DNS that can be used in our
directory service. We assume that the Master server never crashes. The DNS assumes that any
server, at any time, can become unreachable. To rectify this, the DNS data is distributed widely,
and replicated across several DNS servers. Moreover, hosts do a lot of caching in the DND
model. A host contacts a DNS server if its cache does not have an entry for a hostname. Even
though the IP address of a mobile host is volatile, a caller can still benefit from caching a callee’s
IP address, though a secure caller-callee authentication mechanism would be needed. The cache
consistency problem would also need to be addressed.

8.3

Gatekeepers in the H.323 protocol
Our directory service provides support for mobile services, such as Mobile Voice-over-

IP. The H.323 protocol [10] is widely used for Internet Telephony. An optional component of the
H.323 protocol is a Gatekeeper. Terminals (clients) communicate with it using the Registration,
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Admission, and Status (RAS) protocol, when it is present. A terminal uses the RAS protocol to
register with a gatekeeper and to ask the gatekeeper to let it place a call. A gatekeeper is the
central management component of the H.323 protocol, and provides the following main services:
•

Address Translation. It maintains a database that maps aliases (user names) to network
IP addresses. A terminal notifies a gatekeeper its alias and network address, when it
registers with the gatekeeper.

•

Admission and Controlled Access of Terminals. Based on registration privileges of a
user, it may deny access to him. Moreover, it can deny service to users based on
bandwidth availability.
When an H.323 client application starts, it registers (logs in) with a gatekeeper, either

statically or dynamically. In static registration, the client knows the transport address of its
gatekeeper a priori. In dynamic registration, the client sends a “gatekeeper discovery” multicast
on the gatekeeper’s multicast address. A gatekeeper then sends a confirmation back to the client,
informing the client of its IP address. When a client wishes to make a call, it contacts the
gatekeeper for permission; this process is known as admission.
A gatekeeper assumes that clients have fixed IP addresses (or at least infrequently
changing addresses), whereas Agents expect the IP address of mobile hosts to change. Agents,
therefore, require clients to frequently update their IP addresses with them. Since a gatekeeper
manages a zone7 and not the whole network, it is capable of handling frequent IP-updates.
Mobility support by gatekeepers, however, is not a standard included in the H.323 protocol. The
gatekeeper has many modules, one of which is a directory service. We feel that our system can
serve as the directory service module of the gatekeeper, allowing the gatekeeper to support
mobile users. Unless protocols for gatekeeper-gatekeeper communication are deployed (which
they currently are not, but will be in version 3 of H.323), the directory module would contain all
the users of the network instead of just the users of the terminals in that zone.
7

A zone is a subset of terminals and other H.323 components that a gatekeeper manages.
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A gatekeeper makes its zone centralized: the gatekeeper handles all incoming and
outgoing calls. We feel that this adds extra overhead to a call. In our model, communication with
the directory is minimized for making a call, and there is no communication with the directory
when receiving a call. A caller directly makes a call itself, once it obtains the callee’s IP address.
This eliminates the directory service once the call is in progress. Moreover, terminal-gatekeeper
communication is done using UDP, necessitating timeout mechanisms at the Application-layer
level. We feel that client-Master communication should be done using TCP, since this delegates
the responsibility of message delivery to the lower layers (the IP-request process uses TCP at
each step).
Security is a chief concern. The H.235 recommendation (security recommendation for Hseries protocols) [11] suggests terminal-gatekeeper authentication. It does not, however, propose
a way of encrypting the communication between the two. Due to a lack of encryption, we feel
that the gatekeeper model is inadequate for our purposes, as an eavesdropper can easily ascertain
the identity and location (via IP address) of a user.
The gatekeeper model does have some advantages over our model. A gatekeeper can
keep track of the number of minutes a user uses in call-time during a fixed time-period. The
Master server, in our model, does not interpose on caller/callee data, and so cannot record such
information, which might be useful for accounting purposes.
The gatekeeper model was not designed to support host mobility. We feel, however, that
the features available in the gatekeeper model are useful. If we could mesh the two models
together, we could have a powerful tool for Internet telephony, at least.
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9

Future Work
In the light of the above discussion, we realize the drawbacks of our system and hope to

extend the functionality that it offers. Here are some ideas for future work, mostly to address
limitations that Section 7 describes.

9.1

Implementation of security features
The prototype of our model does not have the security features that we elaborate in this

paper. We hope that someone carries on from where we left off, and implements security and
authentication so that the prototype is a complete application of our model.

9.2

Robustness
We plan to add alternative mechanisms so that failure of the Master does not bring the

whole system down. One approach is to have more than one Master server, and clients
dynamically discover one of the many Master servers by multicasting a “Master discovery”
packet when they register. This proposition is similar to the gatekeeper discovery process in the
H.323 protocol (see Section 8.3).

9.3

Automatic management of Agents
Currently, Agents must be started manually. Ideally, there should be a process monitoring

the number of registered users; it should add more Agents when usage increases, and remove
Agents when the load is low. This would give the system the ability to automatically replace a
crashed Agent.
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Our model requires that a crashed Agent be restarted on the same host, because clients
cannot be reassigned to different Agents. If we develop a way to efficiently reassign clients to
different Agents when Agents crash, we can remove this limitation.

9.4

Addition of Non-Repudiation as a Security Feature
The directory does not assist in any communication between the caller and the callee,

after the IP-request process. Consequently, the directory has no conclusive evidence that a certain
caller called a callee. The directory should provide non-repudiation as a security feature. If Alice
claims that Trudy called her, and Trudy repudiates her claim, the directory should furnish a proof
to prove Trudy wrong.

10

Conclusion
This directory service is a scalable, robust, and secure solution to the problem of

obtaining current IP addresses of people on mobile devices. With wireless networks being
deployed rapidly, the need for such a system is imminent. The system can be improved if certain
existing protocols are incorporated into its design. It can benefit from a protocol such as the
DND, for communication between the Master and the central database. On the other hand, the
H.323 gatekeeper can benefit from our techniques to support mobility, making it more versatile to
the varying demands of network administrators.

11
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